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TITLE II-GENERAL IMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
This title repeals or conforms the over fifty existing federal
immunity statutes 1 and establishes a uniform federal immunity
statute 2 to apply to proceedings before or ancillary to a court,
grand jury, or agency of the United States, either house of
3
Congress, or its joint committees, committees or subcommittees.
The scope of immunity granted protects a witness from the use of
his testimony or its fruits in a future criminal prosecution, but
does not protect him from prosecution itself.4 This reflects a
positive decision by Congress that the fifth amendment
self-incrimination clause only requires a grant of what has been
referred to as "use" or "testimonial" immunity rather than "transactional" immunity. 5
Originally, this provision was promulgated to strengthen the
evidence gathering process against organized crime: 6 it applied
only to court and grand jury proceedings. 7 Subsequently, the
recommendations of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws were adopted establishing a general federal
immunity statute that applied to legislative and administrative
proceedings as well as judicial proceedings."
II. PROVISIONS
The statute requires a witness to claim affirmatively his privilege against self-incrimination before he can obtain immunity. 9
This requirement has been included to avoid a broad grant of
immunity that would operate automatically upon a witness's testiISee amendment to table of parts, §§ 202-59, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
[hereinafter
cited as O.C.C.A.] § 201 (b).
2
See S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 55 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
3

18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (Supp. 1971).

4 Id. See also SENATE REPORT 32.

5 See H. R. REP. No. 91- 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT]; SENATE REPORT 145, 51-56; In re Grand Jury Testimony of Kinoy, No.

M-l 1-188, at 12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1971).
6 Hearingson S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122,
and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 282 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
I See SENATE REPORT 55.
8

id.
9 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (Supp. 1971).
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mony' 0 under subpoena. 1 ' Requiring this assertion of the fifth
amendment right serves as a warning to the prosecutor that the
line of questioning might incriminate the witness; the prosecutor
must then decide whether to terminate the line of questioning or
seek a grant of immunity. 12 Thus, grants of immunity are intentional and under the control of the Government. 3
A. Prospective Grants of Immunity
In the interests of administrative efficiency,' 1 4 the statute authorizes the issuance of a prospective grant of immunity 15 so that an
order may be issued directing a witness to testify on a particular
subject in advance of his appearance before the questioning
body.1 6 An order of this nature would be conditional, however,
with the immunity not taking effect until the witness actually
refused to answer questions on the basis of his privilege and was
then ordered to do so by the presiding official. 1 7 It is reasoned that
10Although throughout this section reference is made to a witness's "testimony," the
statute specifically refers to testimony or "other information," 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 6002-05
(Supp. 1971), which is defined to include "any book, paper, document, record, recording or
other material." 18 U.S.C.A. § 6001 (Supp. 1971). The explicit inclusion of these items
within the statute precludes any potential problems regarding which documents are within
the privilege.against self-incrimination. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
11 See SENATE REPORT 145; HOUSE REPORT 42.

12 See Statement of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., for the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws [hereinafter cited as Comm. Ref. Crim. L.], Senate Hearings 290,
at 298. It is submitted that this warning to the prosecutor may not be necessary when
immunity is reduced from transactional to use immunity. When transactional immunity is
available, under "automatic" statutes the prosecutor is unaware of which of his questions
will result in statements that would preclude future prosecution. But when only use
immunity is available, future prosecution is not precluded; only the use of the testimony is
prohibited. Therefore, regardless of whether answers incriminating the witness are given,
the prosecutor is theoretically in the same position with respect to future prosecution of
the witness. Thus, with use immunity, the fear of an immunity bath may be unfounded;
however, requiring the witness to claim his privilege to obtain immunity "may well be a
trap for the witness." United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 430 (1943). This may be
especially so when an unwary witness is informed that a court has issued an immunity
order which can now be issued prospectively before the witness has begun testifying. (18
U.S.C.A. §§6003, 6004, 6005 (Supp. 1971)). He may very well be "trapped" into
incriminating himself unless the prosecutor explains that the order is not effective until the
witness claims his privilege.
13 See Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 298.
14 1d. 317.
15 18 U.S.C.A. § 6003 (Supp. 197 1); SENATE REPORT 145; HOUSE REPORT 42-43.
16 Compare with Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a) (1964), repealed by
§ 228(a), O.C.C.A. construed in In re McElrath, 248 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (statute did
not authorize prospective immunity grant). See also In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631, 637 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
The constitutionality of the portion of the statute authorizing prospective immunity
grants has been challenged as not presenting a "case or controversy" as required by U.S.
CONST. art 111. In re Grand Jury Testimony of Kinoy, No. M-I 1-188, at 5-7 (S.D.N.Y.,

Jan. 29, 1971). The question was not decided, however, because the immunity grant in

question was not wholly prospective and presented an actual controversy. Id. at 7.
17 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003, 6004, 6005; See also Comm. Ref. Crim. L., letter to
the President, March 17, 1969, Senate Hearings 287, at 288; Comm. Ref. Crim. L.,
Senate Hearings 317- 18.
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the questioning body will sometimes be forewarned that a witness
is likely to invoke his fifth amendment privilege. Consequently,
this provision enables the procedural requirements for obtaining
an immunity grant to be met in advance without having to interrupt the proceeding once it has begun.'
It should be noted that the statute does not provide for notice
to a defendant when a prospective immunity grant is sought, nor
does it provide for the defendant's participation in such proceeding. This omission reflects a conscious desire on the part of the
draftsmen to allow orders to be obtained ex parte.19 However, the
draftsmen recognize that this omission of notice may not be
valid, 20 and that a judicially imposed notice requirement would
2
not materially affect the statutory scheme. 1
B. Court and Grand Jury Proceedings
Although the statute enables the same type of immunity to be
conferred for administrative, congressional and judicial proceedings, it sets up separate procedural requirements for obtaining
such grants. In court and grand jury proceedings, the United
States attorney may apply to the district court for an immunity
order if he has obtained the approval of the Attorney General,
believes that the testimony sought is necessary to the public
interest, and such witness has refused or is likely to refuse to
22
testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. It
is the United States attorney who must be satisfied that the
testimony is in the national interest, or that the witness is likely to
refuse to testify.23 The district court may not review the prosecutor's discretion, its only role being to ascertain whether the
procedural requirements have been met. Upon an affirmative de1s

Id.

19 Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 318.
20 Id. See In re McElrath, 248 F.2d 612, 616- 17 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (en banc); In re Bart,
304 F.2d 631, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962). In McElrath, nine judges believed that upon application for an order of immunity, the defendant should be notified and had a right to
intervene. Four judges concurred in an opinion basing this right on Rule 24(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The remaining five concurred in an opinion by the now
Chief Justice Burger, stating: "We go beyond the companion opinion and hold that the
witness should be given reasonable notice of the application, be allowed to appear in the
proceeding and be heard ....
248 F.2d at 617. The draftsmen have attempted to distinguish this language, but concede that it might be based on a due process notion. Comm.
Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 318. In In re Grand Jury Testimony of Kinoy, No.
M-I 1-188, at 3 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 29, 1971), the issue of whether an immunity order under
this statute could be obtained ex parte was raised but not decided, as the Government
subsequently served the defendant. Although a ruling on this issue was not made, the court
expressed its opinion that notice was required.
21 See Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 319.
22 18 U.S.C.A. § 6003 (Supp. 1971).

23 Id.; HOUSE REPORT 43; SENATE REPORT 145.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 4:3

termination that such provisions have been satisfied, the court
must issue the requested order 24 without evaluating the merits of
such grant. 25 However, the statute does not appear to restrict a
court's inherent power to require a "good faith" petition by the
prosecutor and to refuse to grant such petitions based on improp26
er motives.
C. Administrative Proceedings
The procedure for immunity in administrative proceedings is
similar to that discussed above. However, the agency itself is
empowered to grant the immunity; 2 7 an order from a district court
is not necessary. Still, there are the similar requirements that the
agency believe the testimony is in the national interest and that
the witness has refused or is likely to refuse to testify.28 The
29
approval of the Attorney General is also necessary.
This latter requirement represents a departure from previous
practice where the agencies were empowered to grant immunity
and could do so without informing the Attorney General. 30 However, since these agencies were not in a position to be aware of
other investigations that may have been undertaken, their grants
of immunity under the old law might have inadvertently frustrated
these other inquiries. Therefore, the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 3 1 proposed that the Attorney
General should serve as a centralized clearing house for these
grants, weigh the impediment to other investigations, and decide
which grants were in the greatest national interest.3 2 The Commission felt that this purpose would be accomplished without
giving the Attorney General a veto power. 33 By granting this
power to the Attorney General, Congress may have infringed
upon the traditional independence of our regulatory commis24 SENATE REPORT 145; HOUSE REPORT 43.

25 Authorizing a court to make such an evaluation might raise "separation of powers"
questions. Ulmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 433-34 (1956).
26
27

See Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 112- 13.
18 U.S.C.A. § 6004 (Supp. 1971).

Id.
Id.
31 Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 314.
21 See Proposed Immunity Provisions, Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 289-90.
See HOUSE REPORT 43.
22 Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 315.
33 Id. The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, proposed only
that the Attorney General be given ten days' notice of the desired grant of immunity,
during which he could informally object. He was not given an ultimate veto power. See
SENATE REPORT 145-46 (commenting on version reflecting the wording of the Comm.
Ref. Crim. L. that was adopted by the Senate, but subsequently amended in the House).
28
29
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sions. 34 It is not clear that the sacrifice of this independence is

justifiable on the basis of gains derived from having the ultimate
power to approve immunity grants in a central body. Although
this goal may be desirable when an improvident immunity grant of
an agency could foreclose a criminal prosecution that was being
independently prepared by another government department, such
is not the case where only use immunity is conferred.3 5 In such a
situation, each agency still would be able to pursue its investigations and prosecutions unaffected by the immunity grants
of another.
D. CongressionalProceedings
The requirements for seeking an immunity grant in
sional proceedings, however, do not provide for a veto
the Attorney General. 3 6 He must be notified ten days
grant is sought, and he can defer the issuance of such a
twenty days.3

7

congrespower in
before a
grant for

This delay will provide him with enough time to

consult Congress and express any possible misgivings.3 8 The Attorney General was not given a veto power in an effort to avert
"separation of powers" questions. 3 9 Moreover, the Attorney Gen40
eral himself could be the subject of a congressional inquiry.
An order for immunity in a congressional proceeding must be
issued by the district court. 41 Once again, the court's role is to
determine if the statutory prerequisites are met.4 2 These require-

ments include a majority vote of the members present to confer
immunity if the proceeding is before either house of Congress or,
if before a committee, two-thirds vote of the members of the full
committee. In addition, the proper notice must be given to the
Attorney General. 43 Although, again, the court is not to review
the merits of such a grant, it may be able to review the constitutional jurisdiction of Congress over the area of inquiry, the
statutory jurisdiction of the agency of Congress over the particular inquiry, and the relevance of the information sought to the
inquiry in question. 44
3

4 Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 315_.
-5 See Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 315.
36 See HOUSE REPORT 43; SENATE REPORT 146.
a7 18 U.S.C.A. § 6005 (Supp. 1971); HOUSE REPORT 43; SENATE REPORT 146.

38 See Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 315.
39 Id. 292, 294, 316.
40 Id. 3 16.
41 18 U.S.C.A. § 6005 (Supp. 1971).
42

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 6005 (Supp. 1971); HOUSE REPORT 43; SENATE REPORT 146.

-18 U.S.C.A. § 6005 (Supp. 1971).
4Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 316.
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USE V. TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY

A. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of substituting use immunity for transactional immunity was foremost in the discussion of title II in both
Senate and House Hearings on the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970. Prior to the enactment of this statute, most immunity
statutes protected the witness from any future prosecution for
crimes revealed as a result of testimony under compulsion.45
These statutes were enacted in the'belief that transactional immunity was constitutionally required by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 46 This view was espoused by the
Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock,4 7 and affirmed in
Brown v. Walker.48 In Counselman, the Court considered the
extent of immunity constitutionally required to displace the privilege:
It is quite clear that legislation cannot abridge a constitutional privilege, and that it cannot replace or supply one,
at least unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in
scope and effect ....
We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the
party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the
incriminating questions put to him, can have the effect of
supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the
United States. Section 860 of the Revised Statutes does not
supply a complete protection from all the perils against which
the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is
not a full substitute for that prohibition. In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must
afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
49
offense to which the question relates.
The present congressional belief that use immunity is now
constitutionally sufficient is founded on the Court's decision in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,50 where the Court discussed
the effect of its decision in Malloy v. Hogan51 (holding the fifth'
amendment privilege applicable to the states) on federal-state
relations in the area of immunity. In Murphy, the Court held that
the fifth amendment protected a state witness from incrimination
under federal law, and that the federal government may not make
4 See Hearingson S. 30, and Related ProposalsBefore Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 161 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings](Dep't of Justice Comments).
46id.
47 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
48 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
49 142 U.S. at 585-86.
50 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
51 378 U.S. I (1964).
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any use of the testimony of such witness obtained under compulsion by a state immunity grant. However, the Court did not
overrule Counselman, nor rule on the extent of immunity that was
required to be extended by a single jurisdiction in order to displace effectively the fifth amendment privilege. The Court has
recently granted certiorari to decide this very question in the
context of single state jurisdictions and state investigating commissions. 52 In a previous case where the Court had granted certiorari to settle this problem, 53 the writ was subsequently dismissed as improvidently granted. 5 4 Five justices voted to dismiss
the writ because of an intervening state court decision, while three
justices, dissenting, did reach the merits and reiterated the trans55
actional immunity standard.
The use immunity provision in title II of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 was held unconstitutional on January 29,
1971, by a United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. 56 Writing an extensive opinion reviewing the constitutional precedent since Counselman, the District Judge ruled
that Counselman has not been eroded by the more recent decisions, and that "transactional immunity is constitutionally required as between the questioning sovereign and the witness .... -57
Thus, it is apparent that serious doubts presently exist concerning the constitutionality of title II. If it is ultimately held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the federal government
will be without the benefit of any formal immunity statute, since
all prior immunity statutes were amended or repealed. 5 8 However,
if this were to occur, the statute could be conformed to require
transactional immunity by altering one clause. Furthermore, there
was discussion in the Senate Hearings to indicate that such a
52-Ziccarelli

v. New Jersey Comm'n of Investigation, No. 91; Sarno v. Illinois Crime

Investigating Comm'n No. 565; 39 U.S.L.W. 1132 (March 2, 1971).
53 Piccirillo v. New York, 397 U.S. 933 (1970).
54 Piccirillo v. New York, 91 S.Ct. 520 (Jan. 25, 1971).
5 See dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Douglas with Mr.
Justice Marshall concurring in each.
51 See In re Grand Jury Testimony of Kinoy, No. M-1 1-188, at 13 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 29,

1970) (Motley, J.). But see Stewart v. United States, No. 71- 1212 (9th Cir., March 29,
1971) (per curiam) (court upheld constitutionality of use immunity provisions of the Act).
' In re Grand Jury Testimony of Kinoy, No. M-I 1-188, at 13 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 29,

1970). In light of the extensiveness of this opinion and the other material written in the
area, a thorough evaluation of the precedent and constitutionality of the present act will
not be undertaken. For other comprehensive analyses of the problem, see Piccirillo v.
New York, 91 S.Ct. 520 (Jan. 25, 1971) (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.); minority
views of Representative William F. Ryan on H.R. 11157, H.R. REP. No. 91- 1188, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1970), also at 116 CONG. REC. H9665 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970). But see

Comm. Ref. Crim. L., Senate Hearings 304.
58 See note I supra and accompanying text.
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course would be expeditiously pursued in that eventuality. 5 9 Thus
it appears that regardless of the scope of immunity that will be
constitutionally required, the remaining statutory structure discussed above will be a continuing part of the federal law. However, if the scope is restricted to transactional immunity, the
present procedural requirements will assume a more functional
role and added purposiveness.
B. TransactionalImmunity as a Prosecutor'sTool
Throughout the consideration of title II it appears to have been
uniformly assumed that use immunity would be a greatly beneficial tool for law enforcement officials, "particularly for the
purpose of securing testimony in cases involving official corruption and organized crime." 60 Since the prosecutor can still prosecute a witness who has been granted immunity if evidence is
derived from an independent source, it has been reasoned that the
prosecutor is in a better position. 6 ' Most criticism has been focused upon the effect this change has on the constitutional rights
of the witness. However, there are instances where transactional
immunity may serve as an important prosecutorial tool, and, accordingly, its replacement with use immunity might serve to burden the prosecutor, particularly in the same area of "official corruption and organized crime."
Of course, one of the avowed purposes of this Act is to
strengthen the evidence gathering process. 6 2 A recurring problem
in the gathering of evidence to prosecute organized criminals is
securing and retaining the cooperation of witnesses so that they
will testify at trial. 63 Because of the threat of reprisals, 6 4 many
potential witnesses refuse to cooperate.
Congress has recognized the need to protect the physical security of the witness and his testimony, by passing provisions providing protected housing facilities for government witnesses, 65 and
securing their testimony by pretrial deposition. 66 However, after
the passage of this Act, the federal government cannot offer
transactional immunity to protect a witness from local prosecution
by corrupt local officials. Organized crime's ability to corrupt
59See Senate Hearings 284 (statement of Representative Poff).
60 House Hearings 160 (Dep't of Justice Comments).
61 See, e.g., SENATE REPORT 55.
62 See Statement of Findings and Purpose, O.C.C.A.
6 See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 198 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
64See SENATE REPORT 59.-60.
6Tit.
V, O.C.C.A.
66Tit. V1, O.C.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503 (Supp. 197 1).
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local officials has been noted in the Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.67 Even though a witness is offered physical protection, he
may not be willing to cooperate if the same people against whom
he is testifying can subsequently prosecute him for his participation in the unlawful conduct.6 8 Although use immunity will prevent local officials from using the witness's testimony or its fruits,
they can nevertheless prosecute on the basis of the independent
69
testimony of the former defendants in the federal prosecution.
The United States attorney is now helpless to protect his witness
from a vendetta prosecution of this nature.

67 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 191.
68 See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

191.

An example of an instance where the Government would probably have been hindered if transactional immunity were not available at the time is presented in United States
v. Addonizio, Crim. No. 548-69 (D. N.J. 1970). There, the former mayor of Newark, New
Jersey, was convicted of extortion, chiefly on the testimony of a government witness who
had been granted transactional immunity. In the course of the testimony the witness
revealed his role in contributing kickbacks to members of the city government. He would
have been loathe to testify if he had to risk local prosecution based on the testimony of the
mayor himself. The compulsory process and a use immunity grant would probably not
have been effective in compelling this testimony, especially if the Government were not
previously aware of this witness's role.
69

